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Metacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-Truth  






In this chapter I present a case study based on ethnographic research carried out in 
Inner Mongolia, northern China. A Buddhist teacher and his students have subtly 
different metacognitive relationships to Buddhism and their practice and knowledge 
are dramatically different as a result. I offer this case study as an example of 
metacognitive variety, and argue that a similar approach is required to understand 
other cases in which people reflect, and attempt to act, on their own cognition and 
cognitive experience, including the transformations that have been described as 
'post-truth'. In conclusion I make some methodological remarks about the study of 
metacognition through ethnography. 
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Social scientists, like other academics concerned with human beings, have been 
trying to refine their understanding of belief, knowledge and ignorance -- in other 
words, their account of how people think about and act on information -- for a very 
long time.1 One consequence of the argument I present in this chapter is that these 
efforts may have been missing an important part of the picture all along. My starting 
point is simply that it is not only academics who are interested in these questions. 
The people we study and write about, too, have their own thoughts about the nature 
of thought -- about what it is like and what it ought to be like. Those theories are 
likely to differ from their academic equivalents, not least because whereas academic 
thought aspires to universal generalizability, 'folk theories' tend to be particular, and 
embedded in specific social relations and practices. 
 
 The temptation will be to see this specificity as a shortcoming and dismiss them, but 
that would be a mistake. If we want to understand what people in general are doing 
when they say they believe something, then understanding metacognition -- in all its 
specificity and variety -- will be very important; we will need to begin to take local 
understandings of thought seriously. As the case study I present here shows, 
metacognitive beliefs and practices can have significant effects on the way people 
think (for instance, they provide strategies for acquiring habits, sensibilities and skills 
                                                       
1 I am grateful to the editors for the invitation to make this argument in this form, and to Tom Bell, 
Joanna Cook and David Henig, members of the Social Anthropology Think Tank at the University of 
Kent, and members of the Centre for Language, Mind and Society, at the University of Hradec 
Krlov for their comments and suggestions. Fieldwork on which this paper is partly based was 
funded by the William Wyse Fund, Cambridge University, and by St John's College, Cambridge. I am 
also deeply indebted to Hotogbayar for his patient instruction. 
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that aim to transform the way in which information that is encountered is experienced 
and understood) and what they think about (for example, by influencing how they 
direct their attention).  
 
The Pew Research Center's latest figures suggest that as of 2015 there are some 
244,000,000 Buddhists in China (ÔBuddhistsÕ 2015), but that figure tells us little 
unless we know something about the variety of things it can mean, in todayÕs China, 
to be a Buddhist. It tells us very little, if anything, about the way these people think 
and act at all. Even if we are well acquainted with the Buddhist philosophy contained 
in texts, we know nothing about the way in which the people described as Buddhist 
think or act until we know how they think their being Buddhist bears on their relation 
to those texts. Do they read them or not? Have they even heard of them? If they do 
read them, how do they do so? Under what conditions do they draw inferences from 
their knowledge about Buddhism or avoid doing so? The principal case study in this 
chapter is drawn from my ethnographic research with Buddhists in Inner Mongolia, 
northern China and it aims to shed a little light on these questions. It can do so only 
for this small corner of what is a vast, and surely a very varied cognitive field, so its 
value for thinking about Buddhism in China as a whole is mainly as an illustration of 
a complexity that will lead us to exercise caution in making generalizations about 
Buddhists in China, 'believers' of other religious traditions, and indeed consumers of 
all kinds of information.  
 
In the case study, I introduce Hotogbayar, a reluctant Buddhist teacher, and his 
students, and explain why I think that master and students represent two distinct 
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approaches, or metacognitive stances, towards the teachings of the Buddha.  One of 
these stances is relatively optimistic, the other pessimistic. The differences between 
them are subtle, but they issue in drastically different behaviour that leads to very 
different relationships to Buddhism as an objectified body of knowledge, which I have 
described elsewhere as distinct 'styles of belief' (Mair 2008; 2013). Though 
Hotogbayar and his students would all readily agree that they are participating in a 
single project, they are also quite aware that their views about the proper relationship 
to that project do not coincide, and this is something that causes Hotogbayar quite a 
bit of consternation. 
 
The Inner Mongolian case is a rather dramatic one, but the conclusions I draw from it 
could apply in any situation in which people objectify and reflect on their relationship 
to a body of knowledge. As an illustration of the potential utility of a focus on 
metacognition, later on in the chapter, I consider the ways an understanding of 
metacognitive diversity might lead to a more accurate account of the developments 
in the past couple of years that have been labelled 'post-truth'. The few academic 
attempts to come to terms with post-truth that have been produced so far, cognitive 
factors loom large, but metacognition has not been seriously considered. I explain 
how a research project might go about putting that right. Finally, in conclusion, I 
make some methodological remarks on the ethnographic study of metacognitive 
variety. 
 
Culture and metacognition 
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It will be useful to say a word about the concept of metacognition to explain how I 
use it in what follows. I have found the framework developed by the psychologist 
John Flavell in his paper ÔMetacognition and cognitive monitoring: a new area of 
cognitive-developmental enquiryÕ to be helpful (Flavell 1979). Though some 
subsequent authors have suggested modifications to Flavell's model, these have 
mostly been minor and his original scheme suits my purposes well. Flavell defines 
metacognition as 'knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena' (Flavell 
1979 p. 906), and further distinguishes between four related phenomena: (1) 
metacognitive knowledge, (2) metacognitive experience, (3) goals and (4) actions or 
strategies (Flavell 1979 p. 907). Metacognitive knowledge is any knowledge 'that has 
to do with people as cognitive creatures and with their diverse cognitive tasks, goals, 
actions, and experiences. An example would be a child's acquired belief that unlike 
many of her friends, she is better at arithmetic than at spelling' (Flavell 1979 p. 907). 
Metacognitive experiences are 'cognitive or affective experiences that accompany 
and pertain to any intellectual enterprise', such as 'the sudden feeling that you do not 
understand something another person just said' (Flavell 1979 p. 907).  
 
By 'goals' and 'strategies', Flavell refers to the objectives of some 'cognitive 
enterprise' and the tasks carried out to achieve those objectives, respectively. Goals 
and strategies may be straightforwardly cognitive, or metacognitive.  
 
As an example of the former, you sense (metacognitive experience) that you 
do not yet know a certain chapter in your text well enough to pass tomorrow's 
exam, so you read it through once more (cognitive strategy, aimed at the 
Mair, J. (Forthcoming). ÔMetacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-TruthÕ. In J. Proust & M. 




straightforward cognitive goal of simply improving your knowledge). As an 
example of the latter, you wonder (metacognitive experience) if you 
understand the chapter well enough to pass tomorrow's' exam, so you try to 
find out by asking yourself questions about it and noting how well you are able 
to answer them (metacognitive strategy, aimed at the metacognitive goal of 
assessing your knowledge, and thereby, of generating another metacognitive 
experience) (Flavell 1979 p. 908 f).   
 
Flavell's is interested in metacognition from a developmental and educational 
psychology point of view, which is to say he is interested in the way in which infants 
pass through identifiable and regular stages of metacognitive ability in their 
development towards adulthood, and in the ways in which additional skills might be 
taught to children and adults in order to make their 'cognitive enterprises' more 
effective. What I find fascinating about this schema from a comparative point of view 
is that the idea that metacognitive knowledge (including knowledge about 
metacognitive experience, and about goals and strategies) can be taught means that 
there can be cultures of metacognition that are specific to particular periods in 
history, to particular cultures, or to specific groups or practices within them. 
 
As a short hand, in most of what follows I refer to specific combinations of 
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences, and related goals and 
strategies as 'metacognitive stances'. What I am getting at by the use of this term is 
that we need to be ready to interpret peopleÕs relationships to bodies of knowledge 
using concepts that are thicker, more substantive and complex, more specific than 
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broad-brush doxastic attitudes such as ÔbeliefÕ, ÔdeferenceÕ and so on. For instance, 
the difference between the two Inner Mongolian Buddhist metacognitive stances I 
describe is subtler than the difference between believing and not believing; they are 
both deferential stances in some sense, but their differences show that 'deference' 
does not begin to capture their specificity. Likewise, this example will remind some 
readers of the theory, popularized by scholars such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith (Smith 
1963) and Karen Armstrong (Armstrong 2001), that there is a distinctive religious or 
'faith' mode through which some forms of knowledge are apprehended -- but how 
can it be that religious people the world over share one form of reason when the 
students I describe here exhibit a cognitive stance that is significantly different from 
that of their own teacher? In the section on post-truth, my suggestion is that what 
marks out those who are particularly disposed to believing 'fake news' may be 
something more historically specific than political affiliation, a singular combination of 
particular theories about the nature of information and its sources and the relation of 
both to economic interest, perhaps.  
 
This is not the place to explore the long and complex history of anthropological 
thought about belief, but suffice it to say that my conclusions here are challenging for 
what passes for disciplinary orthodoxy on the topic. Many anthropologists have 
argued that the concept of ÔbeliefÕ belongs exceptionally to those societies in which 
anthropology and other social sciences first emerged, and that it is therefore 
misleading to apply it in societies where those traditions have had little influence 
(Ruel & Davis 1982).  
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The most influential version of this approach sees ÔbeliefÕ as a distinctively Christian 
or perhaps Abrahamic concept, one that is marked by a complex and contradictory 
intellectual history, so that when, say, a competent English speaker uses the term, 
she invokes a chain of diverse and sometimes contradictory connotations (Needham 
1972), as well as a whole monotheistic metaphysics that invests belief in entities that 
lie ÔbeyondÕ the world of human experience (Pouillon 1982). Another version sees the 
mental hygiene that is required for ordered, coherent and stable beliefs as the 
distinctive product of disciplined and objectified thought, something that arises only 
in historically unusual social fields such as capitalist book-keeping and academia 
(Bourdieu 1986; 1990 p. 381).  
 
In either case the upshot is the same: that the standard social scientific expectations 
-- that everyone has a stable and coherent set of beliefs from which their behaviour 
is consistently derived -- are the result of ethnocentric assumptions and are 
inapplicable in many of the contexts that anthropologists have traditionally worked 
(Ruel & Davis 1982). In those contexts, people are said not to care very much about 
a supposedly interior world of beliefs and reasons, instead, their focus is said to be 
practical (Evans-Pritchard 1937). Language that appears to refer to beliefs, in such 
societies, should be understood as metaphorical or expressive, for example, of 
assent to the prevailing social system (Leach 1966). Such views are longstanding in 
anthropological literature and continue to be endorsed (Handelman 2008; Lindquist 
& Coleman 2008; N Hamayon 2006). In particular, when it comes to the 
anthropology of religion, undergraduates are commonly taught the commonsensical 
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Ôstress on ÒbeliefÓ may be misleading for the kinds of religions studied by 
anthropologistsÕ (Bloch 2005 p. 107). 
 
My argument in this chapter is incompatible with this view for the same reason it is 
incompatible with the idea that there is a universal attitude of faith shared by all 
religious people. Or rather, it is compatible with only half of this view. The idea that 
there are distinctive styles of belief that are characteristic of Christianity or modernity 
is plausible, though I would rather think of styles of belief in the plural even in those 
contexts. However, the idea that everywhere else what Flavell calls 'cognitive 
enterprises' are of little interest, or that non-modern or non-'Western' cognitive life is 
so exotic we cannot begin to fathom it does not ring true to me. Certainly, the 
example I present here is one counterexample: a case in which non-Christian, non-
'Western' people reflect on and invest care in their own cognitive attitudes in specific 
and distinctive ways. Let me turn to that example now.  
 
Metacognitive variety in some forms of Inner Mongolian Buddhism 
Buddhism in Inner Mongolia 
Inner Mongolia is an autonomous region with the same formal political status in the 
Chinese state as Xinjiang and Tibet. It has international borders with the Republic of 
Mongolia, and, in the far north east, with Russia. The autonomous status of the 
region is a product of its association with a minority ethnic group or nationality 
(minzu, to use the Chinese term),2 the Mongolians, though they now make up only 
                                                       
2 Foreign-language terms in this chapter are in Mongolian unless otherwise indicated. There is no 
single standard of Romanization for Mongolian that captures both spelling and pronunciation. Here I 
have opted for a rendering that aims at approximating pronunciation. 
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about 15% of the population. Most Mongolians in the region can speak Mandarin, but 
many also speak Mongolian and follow Mongolian-language media, which are 
supported by the state under minority nationality policies, and some elderly people 
and those living in rural areas may have limited proficiency in Mandarin. In the past, 
much of Inner Mongolia was home to pastoral nomads, but settlement policies, 
enclosure of open land, and urban development have led to a steep decline in 
nomadism.  
 
For Inner Mongolians, one of the most salient aspects of Mongolian culture is the 
practice of Tibetan Buddhism. The religion was adopted by an important khan in the 
region in the seventeenth century. Thousands of monasteries were built during the 
subsequent two and a half centuries, and many of them became very powerful, 
controlling vast swathes of pastoral land and the people and livestock that lived on it. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, vast numbers of Mongolian men had taken 
vows as monastics, though many of these were so-called 'countryside lamas', who 
lived as householders most of the time but attended monasteries for festivals. 
 
However, political instability and growing calls for modernisation meant that the 
institutions of Buddhism were under increasing pressure by the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Mongolian and Chinese nationalists alike blamed Buddhism for 
encouraging weakness and submission. When the Japanese occupied much of what 
is today Inner Mongolia, in the 1930s, they implemented policies aimed at reducing 
the size and power of Buddhist estates. The status of Buddhism in Inner Mongolia 
was thus already much reduced by the time of the civil war in China and by the 
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revolution of 1949, but a much more dramatic decline was on its way. In the 1950s 
the new Communist government reformed land ownership, removing the 
endowments that had long sustained large monastic institutions all over China. 
Pressure on 'religious personnel' to take part in 'productive' work, narrowly conceived 
grew, and celibate monastics were often forced to leave their monasteries to marry. 
By 1958, according to elderly lamas I spoke to in Inner Mongolia, all lamas in the 
region had been forced out into lay life.  
 
In the following two decades, religion was targeted as 'old culture'. Former monks, 
nuns, and priests were harassed, and often tortured and imprisoned. Though the 
policy of freedom of religion was reaffirmed after the death of Mao, people I met who 
were children in the 1980s told me they were mainly aware of Buddhism as 
something one shouldn't mention. It was only in the mid-1990s, as the central 
government promoted the revival of traditional culture in order to foster the tourism 
industry, that the monasteries that had been closed--and with only rare exceptions 
destroyed--began to be rebuilt.3  
 
I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Inner Mongolia, northern China, from summer 
2003 to spring 2005, and have frequently returned for follow-up work. By the time I 
first arrived in Inner Mongolia in 2003, there were hundreds of operational temples. 
Most of them had only two or three lamas, but there were a number of larger centres, 
including Ih Juu in the regional capital, Hohhot, where I spent a good deal of my 
                                                       
3 For a detailed history of Buddhism in Inner Mongolia, seen through the lens of an important 
monastic institution, see (Humphrey & jeed 2013). 
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time. By that time, there was no stigma in attending the temple. On important 
festivals, thousands of people would turn up, mainly, but not exclusively, ethnic 
Mongolians. Many of the people whose homes I visited had set up shrines in order to 
worship (morgoh) more frequently. More recently, the temple has been renovated 
and extended, with a handsome row of new stupas. I have seen the same pattern all 
over Inner Mongolia: temples have been rebuilt and renovated at great cost. There 
are many lay worshippers, and they are unembarrassed about demonstrating their 
commitment to Buddhism publicly. 
 
Humble, but optimistic, metacognition 
One of the activities that I most enjoyed while carrying out fieldwork was studying 
with a lay Buddhist teacher, Hotogbayar (following anthropological convention I refer 
to him by a pseudonym). Hotogbayar was a physics lecturer at a local university, and 
had carried out research on thermodynamics, but he had also served for twenty 
years as the interpreter for Ulaan Gegeen, a senior Inner Mongolian lama. Ulaan 
Gegeen could speak Chinese, but generally felt more comfortable speaking in 
Mongolian, so Hotogbayar would accompany him to official engagements to help 
out. He was also Ulaan Gegeen's disciple or student (shabi), and had been studying 
a specific text with him for the whole of that period: Tsongkhapa's Great Treatise on 
the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment. He had first studied the text in its traditional 
Mongolian translation, and had subsequently read it in Chinese.  
 
He had offered to teach me the text too, and it was, in theory, the topic of our classes 
together. In practice, however, we rarely progressed beyond a few lines as every 
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sentence, and often every word, would prompt long discussions. On one occasion in 
2004, I arrived as usual at nine in the morning and had breakfast with Hotogbayar 
and his wife. Afterwards, we sat down, cross-legged, in Hotogbayar's study, and put 
the facsimile of Mergen Gegeen's Mongolian translation of the Great Treatise on the 
low table between us. Before turning to the text, Hotogbayar asked me, as he had on 
other occasions, about the impression I had formed of the text we were studying. 
The conversation that followed is a typical expression of his views about teaching, 
learning, understanding and believing in the context of Buddhism.  
 
We had been looking at the first part of the work, which establishes the pedigree of 
the book within legitimate teaching lineages in order to inspire the student with 
respect for its contents. I thought carefully about his question and replied that to me 
this way of beginning a book is difficult to accept, since my education has 
consistently taught me to believe nothing on strength of authority alone, but to wait 
for evidence to be presented in support, and to evaluate that evidence critically.4 
 
Hotogbayar looked at me and said, 'Just the opposite is true in Buddhism. If you 
don't believe the author, it is better you don't read the book. Only one kind of people 
in the world can see the truth: only enlightened people. The beginning of the Great 
Treatise is there to tell you that Atisha was enlightened, so his teachings can be 
believed.' He went on, 
 
                                                       
4 Interestingly, some modernist strands of Buddhism have associated this rationalist approach to 
knowledge with Buddhism, in contrast to other religious traditions (Mcmahan 2008 p. 66). 
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Our life is limited, we cannot waste our time. If we lived one or two thousand 
years then no problem. But we don't. So at first we need a solid foundation of 
belief, then to read books of the great lamas of Gelugpa and Nagarjuna--that is 
who is referred to [in the text] by "ornaments of Jambudvipa". In a limited life, 
believe in the Buddha then plan time to read him.  
 
Not all valuable knowledge requires this foundation of belief, he explained. 
Knowledge that falls into the category he called 'common knowledge' can be 
understood simply by learning it and thinking about it. "Why should we read Lao Zi 
and Hegel?" he asked, rhetorically, 
 
This is common knowledge, believable knowledge. You can read it in Britain or 
China, Germany, or wherever. So we know it is real. This is common knowledge 
and everyone should read it.  
 
But for Buddhist teachings, belief must come first, 'If I cannot understand something 
in the teachings, that shows that my level of understanding is too low. One must 
never ask, "Is this right?". Doubt is not permissible (seljej bolohgui). If you doubt you 
may think, "this is not worthwhile".' 
 
If you do not have belief in the three jewels [the Buddha, the Dharma (the 
Buddha's teachings), and the Sangha (the community of monastics)] then you 
cannot have belief in Buddhism. Belief in the three jewels means belief that the 
teachings and monks can give enlightenmentÑbut only qualified ones, belief in 
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unqualified monks will lead to terrible problems. This is why I believe in my 
master [Ulaan Gegeen].  
 
'How do you know which teachers can be believed in?' I asked. 
 
By their actions. Greed, anger and ignorance. But these can be hidden deeply, so 
you have to observe carefully. This depends on your ability to judge.5 One day or 
one year is not long enough to make a decision. Sometimes people take a lot of 
care over small things but not the big ones. So it is OK to doubt some monks, but 
not Tsongkhapa and Atisha,6 because they are qualified, they really understand 
emptiness. 
 
Once a prospective Buddhist has found a teacher in whom he or she can trust, 
Hotogbayar explained, it is necessary to banish doubt and only believe. 
 
Humble and pessimistic metacognition 
Hotogbayar was very atypical in his approach to Buddhism. Most Inner Mongolian 
Buddhists that I encountered were much less confident in their ability to engage 
directly with the teachings, even in the humble spirit that he advocated. This was 
something he recognised and he complained about it frequently. Though he was 
very busy with his university work, he accepted many lay disciples. They came to 
him because of his association with Ulaan Gegeen. Some even suggested that 
                                                       
5 Formally similar problems of judgment and belief are known to some Christians as problems of 
discernment. For a clear discussion of the issues, see Tanya Luhrmann (2008). 
6 Atisha was the Indian master on whose work Tsongkhapa's *Great treatise is a commentary. 
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Hotogbayar himself might be enlightened. He encouraged his students to read 
philosophy and to practise a kind of visualisation meditation, but they were very 
reluctant to do those things. Instead they asked him for practical life advice and for 
suggestions about religious practice: which buddhas to worship, how often, where to 
put them, and so on. Sometimes they just came to be in his presence for a while.  
 
Not all the Buddhists I met in Inner Mongolia were lucky enough to have such a 
distinguished master, but they all, to a greater or lesser extent, shared this attitude, 
which can be described as another metacognitive stance, similar to, yet subtly 
different from, the one that Hotogbayar was trying to teach me. In a nutshell, 
Hotogbayar's view was that the cognition of the unenlightened was severely limited 
but not completely useless. Unenlightened people can, he thought, learn and think 
about the teachings, to the extent that their study is based on an unquestioning trust 
in enlightened masters. As one's wisdom grew, he thought, one's understanding 
would improve and progressively vindicate the belief that all the teachings are 
consistent, making any further doubt that might arise less pressing.  
 
Most of his coreligionists, including his students, took a much more pessimistic view 
of the potential of unenlightened cognition to grasp the truth of Buddhism, preferring 
to concentrate on devotion and worship rather than on philosophy, and meditation. 
This did not mean that they were interested only in practice rather than cognitive 
activity, however. On the contrary, they thought that belief (itgel), was an essential 
part of faith (sjg), and that faith, in turn, was an essential ingredient of effective 
worship. Paying respects and making an offering at a temple, or before a shrine at 
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home, or to a lama, was thought to be beneficial, in proportion to the faith with which 
the action was carried out. Belief, in this context, as many worshippers explained to 
me, meant believing that the teachings of the Buddha are true, believing it with a 
sincere heart (nen setgel), and avoiding all doubt. Faith also entailed respect 
(hndetgel), based on the cultivation of a humble character (daruu jang).  
 
Although some important aspects of this approach to religious life look similar to 
Hotogbayar's, there is an important difference. Both views hold that one must begin 
by accepting axiomatically that the teachings are true. Both hold that failure to 
understand the truth contained in the teachings is due to a fault on the part of the 
believer: insufficient wisdom. However, whereas Hotogbayar's view allows for the 
unenlightened devotee to understand the real meaning of the teachings to a degree, 
imperfectly, with the prospect of gradual improvement, the other Buddhists I knew 
did not think this was possible. 
 
The way this was most commonly explained was by means of a distinction between 
two bodies of knowledge: a deep meaning (gn utga), and a superficial meaning 
(ngn utga). The teachings of the Buddha, all the texts, and the rituals and 
ceremonies that put them into practice were all expressions of the same deep 
meaning. That deep meaning was what the Buddha had understood when he 
attained enlightenment, and it is the same wisdom that is shared by all the 
enlightened beings. Buddhists I met were often referred to this deep meaning using 
terms from Tibetan philosophy such as 'middle view' (dund jel) and 'emptiness' 
(hooson chanar). I did not meet anyone who could or would explain those terms to 
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me apart from Hotogbayar, and he hedged his explanations by telling me they were 
incomplete, the best he was capable of providing.  
 
If the deep meaning is the distinctive attainment of enlightenment and buddhahood, 
it follows that what ordinary, unenlightened people can understand and know about 
Buddhism is not the deep meaning at all, but the surface meaning. This knowledge is 
not the knowledge of the enlightened, so is not the object of respectful belief that 
brooks no doubt. The result of this bifurcated model is that the same people who 
evince a deep seriousness about worship and faithfulness can at the same time treat 
what they know about Buddhist teachings with a degree of levity. TheyÑthe 
unenlightenedÑcan know and understand these things, so, ipso facto, the content is 
not the real deep meaning of the teachings, and it is not the proper object of faithful 
belief. During the performance of rituals at the temples I frequented, for instance, lay 
people and even the lamas would float rumoured explanations for various elements 
of the ritual and wonder which was correct, but would always conclude with a wistful 
sigh and a shrug, saying that Buddhism was 'very deep', that only 'great lamas know' 
and so on.  
 
Only novices sought earnestly to understand the surface content, perhaps by 
referring to information they had read on websites or popular books on Buddhism. 
More experienced devotees soon put them right, tutting and shaking their heads, and 
reminding them that they could not understand. A really faithful Buddhist of this kind 
knows that reading a book of Buddhist philosophy in the expectation of 
understanding it is to exhibit an unfaithful arrogance (omorhog). This was the cause 
Mair, J. (Forthcoming). ÔMetacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-TruthÕ. In J. Proust & M. 




of Hotogbayar's frustration with his students, who would not read his books, however 
much he encouraged them. Faith requires a humble character, and that means 
developing an acute awareness of one's own ignorance. The Buddhists I met 
constantly engaged in what I have described as a discourse of ignorance, lamenting 
their own feeble knowledge and that of all the Mongolian Buddhists, and reciting a 
range of causes of it: from the suppression of Buddhism under the Communists and 
the increasing disconnection of ethnic Mongolians from Mongolian language and 
culture to the coming end-of-Dharma period prophesied in Buddhist cosmology (see 
Mair 2015).  
 
'If you can't believe Atisha', Hotogbayar had told me, 'you can't believe Tsongkhapa, 
and you can't believe the teachings. So reading them is a waste of time.' This was 
intended as an exhortation to believe before reading. His students told me instead 
that really believing the teachings are true, in the deep sense, means accepting that 
they are so difficult that reading them is a waste of time. They admired Hotogbayar 
of course, and they cultivated faith in him. This meant that they would not doubt him, 
and therefore that his serious study of Tsongkhapa was strong evidence that he was 
already enlightened. 
 
Varieties of metacognitive variety in Inner Mongolian Buddhism 
Clearly, an important aspect of what Hotogbayar was trying to teach me in our 
classes was a form of domain-specific (that is, specific to Buddhism and not 
applicable to what he called 'common knowledge') metacognition. It featured all of 
the aspects of a metacognitive stance outlined above. The metacognitive knowledge 
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(1) included the idea that knowledge is divided into two kindsÑBuddhist knowledge 
and common knowledgeÑand that the unenlightened mind is capable of 
apprehending each differently, so that the goal of learning is to be approached 
differently in relation to each of them. The metacognitive experiences (2) that 
Hotogbayar told me about included the experience of humility in relation to Buddhist 
teachings and teachers, the experience of confusion or contradiction that results 
from inadequate wisdom, and the progressive growth in wisdom that helps one to 
understand that the teachings are coherent despite the apparent contradictions. 
'Wisdom allows you to see', as he told me, 'that the scriptures are a complete system 
with no contradictions.'7. The principal goal (3) was to understand the deep meaning 
of Buddhist teachings, and the strategies (4) he advocated to achieve that goal 
included finding a trustworthy teacher, putting one's trust in that teacher, and then 
studying hard while attributing any confusion to one's own inadequacies.8  
 
Metacognition was also an important part of the way in which Hotogbayar's students 
and the ordinary Buddhists I interacted with in temples and on pilgrimages engaged 
with Buddhism, but it was a different combination of theory, experience, goal and 
strategy. They, too, (1) distinguished between ordinary knowledge and the 
knowledge of the Buddha's teachings, but for them, this distinction was mapped to a 
distinction between two kinds of people, the enlightened, who were enlightened 
because they could understand the teachings, and the unenlightened, who could 
                                                       
7 Michael Lempert's Discipline and debate gives a detailed account of the way in which the axiomatic 
assumption that Buddhism has no contradictions is put into practice in a contemporary Tibetan 
monastery in India (Lempert 2012). 
8 Hotogbayar's ideas about metacognition and the importance of submission for finding truth are 
similar in some respects to those discussed by anthropologist Talal Asad in his influential work on 
mediaeval Christianity (Asad 1993). 
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only understand the other, everyday kind of knowledge. The metacognitive 
experience (2) they stressed was the awareness of being ignorant and of being cut 
off from deep meaning. Their principal metacognitive goal (3) was to believe 
intensely and sincerely in the truth of the teachings, which entailed also accepting 
that they were unable to understand their content. The strategies (4) for attaining this 
goal were to monitor their thoughts for signs of doubt during episodes of worship, to 
rehearse a number of narratives about ignorance, and abstaining from intellectual 
engagement with Buddhist philosophyÑthat is, but refusing to read the kind of books 
Hotogbayar wished his students would read. Both Hotogbayar and his students 
stressed that in order to believe in the right way, it was important to cultivate a 
humble character, which was equally a matter of self-conscious cognitive humility as 
of physical restraint.9 
 
For reasons of space, my exposition of these two approaches to Buddhism is 
necessarily rather schematic, and I certainly know people in Inner Mongolia whose 
approach to religion does not coincide neatly with either. However, what should be 
apparent already is that understanding metacognitive variety is absolutely essential if 
we seek to understand cognition, action and experience in relation to bodies of 
knowledge. When we read that, say, Buddhism is booming in China, or when we try 
to interpret a survey that purports to show the proportion of countries' populations 
that subscribe to one or another religion, it is tempting to think that we can infer from 
this how people will think or act. Before we can do that, however, we need to 
                                                       
9 Michael Carrithers has written persuasively on the importance of physical comportment as an 
expression of religious virtue in the context of Jainism and Buddhism in contemporary South Asia 
(1990). 
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understand the variety of things it can mean to 'subscribe' in each case. From a 
distance, Hotogbayar and his students might look very similar. However, what they 
take from their engagement with Buddhism is quite different, and the difference must 
be understood in terms of metacognitive variety. 
 
Consequences of metacognitive variety for cognition and action 
It should already be apparent that if our aim is to understand the thought and action 
of people involved in Inner Mongolian Buddhism, understanding the specific forms of 
tacit and explicit metacognition that they form in relation to their religion will be 
absolutely crucial. Metacognition is not simply a matter of idle reflections on the 
nature of the mind and the apprehension of its objects, something that people may or 
may not think about when they are not engaged in the real business of the first-order 
knowledge and practice. It plays a central part in reasoning and action. To be more 
specific, there are at least two ways in which this is true.  
 
(1) In order to understand the ways in which people interpret the information about 
Buddhism that they encounter, it is necessary to know their view of their own 
cognitive capacities in relation to such information. For the pessimistic Buddhists I 
have described, this will depend on their classification of the information into the 
categories of deep and superficial meaning. Usually a single utterance, or symbol, or 
action will be said to have a deep and a superficial meaning simultaneously. The 
deep meaning is not thought to be available to the unenlightened, so no inferences 
can be drawn from it. The superficial meaning is available, inferences can be and are 
Mair, J. (Forthcoming). ÔMetacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-TruthÕ. In J. Proust & M. 




drawn from it, but those inferences are treated as provisional and untrustworthy, 
rather than definitive.  
 
For the more optimistic Hotogbayar, the distinction is between enlightened and 
unenlightened beings: the deep meaning is available to all, but can only be 
imperfectly understood by an unenlightened person, in proportion to that person's 
wisdom. Hotogbayar is thus willing to draw inferences from Buddhist teachings, and 
to take them seriously, but would seek the approval of his master before settling on a 
conclusion. This accounted for his having read The great treatise some twenty times, 
painstakingly taking notes and seeking advice from Ulaan Gegeen and other trusted 
teachers as he did so each time.  
 
(2) Metacognition provides normative standards of belief, knowledge, assertion, and 
so onÑphilosophers have called these 'epistemic norms' (Pollock 1987). 
Understanding epistemic norms is important if we want to understand how people 
evaluate cognition, both their own and other people's. Perhaps more importantly, 
however, these norms also act as models, so that people act in ways that are likely 
to bring them closer to achieving the model. That might be a matter of actively 
controlling their exposure to information (by reading or avoiding reading Buddhist 
philosophy, for instance), or it might be a matter of cultivating the cognitive capacities 
and habits that are considered to be conditions of belief or knowledge under a 
particular metacognitive scheme. 
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According to Hotogbayar, for instance, in respect of Buddhist teachings, to know the 
teachings one should be very familiar with them, ideally memorising them so they 
could be contemplated without referring to a text. However, proper knowledge was 
dependent on finding a reliable teacher to explain the meaning of the teachings, and 
on a cultivated faithfulness in that teacher, which in turn depended on successfully 
cultivating the ability to refrain from doubt. Knowing in this sense was based on an 
awareness that, as an unenlightened being, one was ignorant to some extent, so 
that one's knowledge had its limits.  
 
Hotogbayar contrasted his own approach to knowledge and belief with the critical 
approach I claimed as my own. He said, 
 
On one level your education is better. It stops you from believing blindly, you can 
doubt anyone. You research things first then come to a decision. But the 
conclusion you reach is the conclusion of ordinary people, not of enlightened 
people. Your decision may be wrong and then you will follow an error and waste 
your time.  
 
In Buddhism you do not need research, what you need to research is why the 
Buddha said what he did. This is to increase our own level of understanding, not 
to doubt. In Buddhism, research means doubting yourself, not Buddha or the 
three jewels. This may be an essential difference. When you read Buddhist books 
I suggest you don't doubt the authors, just yourself. But when you read science 
you can doubt them because they are not enlightened people.  
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For Hotogbayar's students, the awareness of ignorance was perhaps even more 
important. Some philosophers have argued that knowledge should be considered the 
norm of belief. That is to say, that proper, permissible belief ought to be based on 
knowledge. Extending this way of thinking about metacognition to my Inner 
Mongolian cases, we might say that for Hotogbayar's students, in the context of 
Buddhism, ignorance, not knowledge, is a norm of belief. That is to say that the 
unenlightened can only justifiably believe in something of which they are ignorant. 
This makes sense since only the deep meaning of Buddhism is thought to be a 
proper object of faithful belief, and the deep meaning is, as a matter of definition, 
only available to the enlightened. 
 
Pragmatism and satisficing from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to post-truth 
 
Satisficing and metacognition 
On reflection, my own metacognitive stance is much more complex and consistent 
than I admitted when I rather self-righteously told Hotogbayar, on numerous 
occasions, that I am a critical thinker. I may assiduously reserve judgment when it 
comes to claims about cosmology, but I routinely believe claims of journalists, 
historians, and many of the people I meet every day, so I have my own context-
specific metacognitive practices and epistemic norms. What makes cosmology 
distinctive is not that I lack evidence about it, the same could be said about much of 
my knowledge (to be scrupulous, I must call it belief). I often rely not on evidence, 
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but on testimony, sometimes for information that will be of great practical importance 
for the way I think about and lead my life. 
 
How do I decide how to distribute my scepticism and my credulity between different 
domains? An important ingredient must be pragmatic considerations and what 
economists and theorists of rationality call 'satisficing'. Satisficing is an alternative to 
optimizing in situations in which there is no rational way of achieving an optimum, 
and in which the standard must therefore instead be 'good enough' (Simon 1972). A 
clear example of this arises in relation to the information on which we base beliefs or 
decisions.  
 
As Jon Elster explains in Sour grapes, it seems obvious that sound opinions are the 
products of judgment exercised in the light of the evidence that we have at hand, but, 
 
It will not do for long, however, to talk glibly about "the available evidence", for in 
doing so one begs the crucial question of how much evidence one should 
rationally make available to oneself before arriving at one's belief. This question 
admits to different answers according to the further use, if any, to which the belief 
is to be put (Elster 1983 p. 17). 
 
The stance I adopted towards the cosmological claims of Tsongkhapa's Treatise was 
similar to that of what Elster calls the 'pure scientist', whose only goal is truth.  
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The chances of arriving at a true belief increasing with the amount of evidence, it 
might appear that the search for truth is self-defeating, since a scientist 
committed to it would have to go on collecting evidence forever, always 
postponing the formation of a belief (Elster 1983 p. 17). 
 
I am happy to tolerate this indefinite deferral when it comes to cosmological beliefs, 
such as beliefs about reincarnation and karma, because I do not think believing one 
way or another makes a practical difference to the way I live my life. It was this view, 
which is among other things a metacognitive view, that Hotogbayar was at pains to 
correct. His position was that one must form an opinion on these questions in one's 
lifetime. As we have seen, he thought this should happen neither too soon, nor too 
late. Deciding too soon would leave one, unnecessarily, open to falling under the 
influence of poor teachers. Deciding too late would leave one without sufficient time 
to put one's determinations into practice.  
 
One of the most important things Hotogbayar tried to teach me was thus the urgency 
of forming an opinion about Buddhism in the context of my limited wisdom, and of my 
short human lifespan.10 On some views of cognition, this self-consciousness about 
pragmatic reasons for forming beliefs should undermine certainty (Williams 1973). 
For instance, Elster has argued that to succeed in deciding to believe would mean 
forgetting that the belief was the result of a decision (Elster 1979 p. 47). Hotogbayar 
certainly did not think (at a metacognitive level) that it was impossible to combine, on 
                                                       
10 See Martin Southwold's Buddhism in life for an account of similar reasoning, which he calls 
sapientalism, analysed in different terms (1983). 
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the one hand, a cultivated awareness of the pragmatic importance of adopting a 
belief on the basis of incomplete information with, on the other hand, an iron 
certainty that the belief one has adopted is the truth. Whether people like Hotogbayar 
are capable of doing this (at a cognitive level) is a question my methods make me ill 
placed to answer.  
 
The kind of satisficing that Hotogbayar was encouraging me to engage in is a 
necessary part of any deliberation that is both based on information and expected to 
issue in a decision or action. Though it need not be as explicit or self-consciously 
formulated as it was in his case, we should expect widespread reflection about 
satisficing. Satisficing can be thought of as a metacognitive strategy, and it seems 
likely that it often varies between domains of activity, given that the importance of 
metaphorically rolling up one's sleeves and getting on with it varies from task to task. 
 
Understanding post-truth 
At the end of 2016, OUP's Oxford Dictionaries chose 'post-truth' as its word of the 
year, reflecting a dramatic spike in the use of the decade-old term in the context of 
the campaign for BREXIT in the UK and for the election of Donald Trump in the 
US.11 Commentators have converged on a consensus that, although there have 
always been lies and mistrust in politics, this is in some respects a recognisably 
novel international phenomenon, in which facts are not just spun, but manufactured 
(Lockie 2016), or in which beliefs are driven by emotion rather than information 
(ÔYes, I'd lie to youÕ 2016).  
                                                       
11 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 accessed 26 December 
2016. 
Mair, J. (Forthcoming). ÔMetacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-TruthÕ. In J. Proust & M. 





Attempts to explain the alleged emergence of this new relationship to truth have so 
far focused on the deliberate actions and strategies of its protagonists--leaders such 
as Trump and Farage--and the characteristics of its audience. The leaders are said 
to wield power in 'an effort to overwhelm truth' (Till 2017). Modern citizens are said to 
be poorly educated, brought up on conspiracy theory (Peters 2017), assailed by a 
surfeit of information, in a world that lacks trust, but is full of competing sources of 
authority. Their senses are deadened by the internet (McCartney 2016). They are 
locked into their social media echo chambers and are not exposed to views that 
challenge their prejudices. Their news sources present current affairs in the form of 
ever more vacuous sound-bites and photo-ops shaped to capture attention and fit 
the 24-hour news cycle (Peters 2017). These conditions are said to have 
exacerbated the tendencies of all humans to fall for universal cognitive biases, 
especially confirmation bias.  
 
All of these factors are perfectly plausible, but in these explanations, post-truth 
audiences are purely passive, and they fall victim to untruths essentially because 
they lack the proper information, training and skills. However, anyone interested in 
understanding these changes ought to be open to the possibility that as well as 
passivity and lack, there is also an active or substantive aspect to the situation. 
Explaining post-truth in terms of fragmentation of authority, cognitive bias, laziness, 
and so on, does not allow for the possibility, which ought at least to be investigated, 
that acceptance of post-truth representations may depend on knowledge, skills, 
Mair, J. (Forthcoming). ÔMetacognitive variety, from Inner Mongolian Buddhism to Post-TruthÕ. In J. Proust & M. 




values, reflection and effort just like the two metacognitive stances I have sketched 
for Inner Mongolian Buddhism. 
 
Some have described post-truth as a form of self-deception or wishful thinking in 
which non-epistemic considerations are brought to bear in the process of belief 
formation. For example, a recent editorial in American Scientist argues that groups 
that benefit from the status quo resist scientific knowledge, for example, about 
climate change, when it threatens their interests (Vernon 2017). 'What matters is not 
whether the claims of politicians can be proven true.' writes Stewart Lockie in his 
editorial in Environmental Sociology, 'What matters is whether those listening to 
those claims would like them to be true Ð truth being judged not by evidence but by 
consistency with listenersÕ existing beliefs and values' (2016 p. 1). There is surely 
something in these functionalist explanations, but they beg the question, just as 
Marxist ideas about ideology did, about the mechanisms that allow believers to avoid 
doubt in circumstances where doubt threatens or appears to threaten their interests 
(Elster 1983 44).  
 
Like belief, ignorance is often the result of specific strategies on the part of the 
ignorant and of those who would keep them in the dark. In addition, in order to be the 
object of metacognitive goals and strategies, specific areas of doubt, uncertainty and 
ignorance must first be recognised, and this awareness of the lack of knowledge 
must relate to metacognitive knowledge and experience (Mair et al. 2013).  
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Understanding the metacognitive theories, experiences, goals and strategies that 
allow specific groups in respect of specific domains of activity to achieve belief and 
control doubt, or maximise doubt and avoid belief, is a topic that requires further 
research. It seems likely that if there is really a difference between post-truth and 
what went before it, then some of the difference at least can be explained in terms of 
metacognitive variety on the part of the recipients.  
 
One suggestion that could be seen in metacognitive terms is that general publics 
have adopted bastardized versions of relativism and scepticism derived from 
academic postmodernism, which has, as Peter Pomerantsev has argued in Granta 
Magazine, 'trickled down over the past thirty years from academia to the media and 
then everywhere else' and has taught us that 'every version of events is just another 
narrative, where lies can be excused as "an alternative point of view" or "an opinion", 
because "itÕs all relative" and "everyone has their own truth" (and on the internet they 
really do)' (2016). This relativism is associated with a demotic anti-elitism that casts 
doubt on information from 'elite' sources on the grounds of the theory that the 
primary interest of the powerful is in their own interests, and not in the truth (Lockie 
2016). 
 
Such epistemological scruples would be a kind of metacognitive theory, one that is 
probably, as in the examples I have discussed above, applied only in some domains 
of activity. And if we find such a metacognitive theory, we should also ask to what 
extent it is regularly accompanied by the other elements of a metacognitive stanceÑ
specific metacognitive experiences, goals and strategies. Taking inspiration from the 
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Inner Mongolian metacognitive stances I have described, we might also ask whether 
specific post-truth metacognitive stances are pessimistic or optimistic and in what 
ways. 
 
I am not arguing here that post-truth metacognition should be considered religious or 
equivalent to religious metacognitive stances and that both should be opposed to 
scientific metacognitive styles. The message of the Inner Mongolian contrast I have 
painted above is that things are more complicated than that. If anything, the sceptical 
approach of post-truth has more in common with the hyper-critical approach that I 
told Hotogbayar was the product of my scientific education. Climate-change sceptics 
often see themselves as defenders of the scientific method(Lockie 2016 p. 3), for 
instance, while those of us who feel threatened by these developments find 
ourselves grasping for an unfamiliar and uncomfortable language of epistemic 
deference. Writing against post-truth and lamenting the 'death of expertise', for 
instance, political scientist Tom Nichols has argued that reasoned public discourse 
requires popular acknowledgement of expert opinion, recalling his own teacher, 
James Schall, who wrote that 'Òstudents have obligations to teachers,Ó including 




The question of whether normative cognition takes a single form, to be applied to all 
domains of thought and action, or multiple forms, each attuned to a specific domain, 
is core metacognitive question itself and it may turn out to be an area in which 
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research will uncover considerable variety.12 To be successful, such research must 
be clearly distinguished from the normative study of epistemology (which aims to 
determine the right or at least best configuration of metacognition), and from the 
study of universal metacognitive traits and tendencies.  
 
Experimental work such as is conducted by psychologists will surely have an 
important place in understanding metacognition. However subjects' self-reports must 
also have a role in attempts to understand metacognitive diversity. It is true that 
people may have significant metacognitive theories, experiences and habits of which 
they do not have a developed reflective awareness and which they are therefore 
incapable of articulating clearly. It is also surely the case that people are often 
mistaken or even self-deceiving about the quality and consistency of their own 
cognition and metacognition, and that they are therefore not reliable witnesses.  
 
However, an important part of at least some forms of metacognition must be 
reflection on metacognitive theories and experiences, the self-conscious adoption of 
certain norms, including epistemic norms, and the deployment of specific strategies 
aimed at cultivating a form of cognition that conforms to those norms. All of these are 
important, and shape behaviour, language and thought, even if they are incompletely 
or imperfectly effective in producing the desired changes in cognition. For instance, 
the different metacognitive stances of Hotogbayar and his students explain their 
choices to study Buddhist teachings assiduously or not at all. That is true regardless 
                                                       
12 Writing about research scientists working with animals, who cultivate objectivity by self-consciously 
abstaining from anthropomorphism, Matei Candea has described a third possibility, in which a strong 
norm is cultivated for one setting (science) through rigorous self-monitoring, while cognition in other 
contexts is simply less strictly regulated (2013). 
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of whether or to what extent their strategies actually help them to make progress 
towards their respective goals, for instance, greater wisdom, or greater humility, or 
the eradication of doubt.  
 
In the same way, using experimentation to understand the ways in which people in 
fact respond to information, misinformation and correction is surely important. 
Subjects' own assessment of their ability to process such information wisely may be 
inaccurate. However, attention to local accounts of belief, whether garnered through 
ethnographic methods or through literary analysis is also essential. That is because 
local metacognitive knowledge can sometimes define the domains of activity and the 
categories of information or knowledge that determine the ways in which people 
plan, monitor and regulate their own cognition.  
 
For example, the distinction between the religious domain and the domain of the 
everyday might seem to be a low-level classification, and therefore a safe basis for 
cross-cultural experimentation and comparison on domain-specific cognition. 
However, the case I have discussed here includes two related but different 
metacognitive stances, of which only one, Hotogbayar's, includes a metacognitive 
distinction between Buddhist and common knowledge that seems to correspond to 
the religion/everyday categorisation. His students' approach, as we have seen, 
distinguishes between deep meaning and surface meaning of Buddhist teachings, 
and counsels different epistemic norms, and different cognitive habits, in relation to 
each of them, even though they are both firmly associated with religion, so the 
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subtleties of their metacognitive stance would be lost in any protocol in which the 
religion/everyday distinction was assumed. 
 
If these kinds of variety are widespread, and there is no reason to think this is an 
unusual case, then understanding what we might call cultures of metacognitionÑ
such as specific forms of religious belief, or 'post-truth' orientationsÑwill need to 
proceed as much through close observation of behaviour and informal, explicit 
statements about belief and doubt as by experimentation. 
 
Domain-specific metacognitive variety 
What I hope to have shown in this chapter, in relation to the Inner Mongolian 
Buddhist material I have presented and in relation to the questions I have raised 
about the phenomenon of post-truth, is that paying attention to metacognitive 
diversity can help to overcome a tacit and unhelpful distinction between cognitive 
form and cognitive content. The convention in the human and social sciences is to 
treat the form of thought as universal while focusing on the great diversity of the 
content to which thought is applied. It is clear that this model is unsatisfactory. Even 
the most basic functions of thought, such as believing and doubting, can be made 
the object of tacit theories and experience, as well as self-conscious reflection, 
ethical evaluation, and concerted attempts to mould them into specific forms by 
building habits, directing attention, associating cognitive functions with emotion and 
so on. The distinction between form and content is muddier than we usually assume. 
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Since elements of metacognition (theories, goals, and so on) and what I have called 
'metacognitive stances' (complex configurations of metacognitive elements) are often 
taught, like other kinds of culture that are passed on through formal and informal 
teaching, they are likely to vary historically and geographically. However, they can 
also vary across different activities or domains in which a single person is engaged. 
For example, Hotogbayar was frustrated with my critical approach to reading not 
because he thought this was a bad form of thinking. Rather, he thought I had failed 
to distinguish between two different domainsÑcommon knowledge and Buddhist 
knowledgeÑfor which different forms of thought were appropriate. 
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